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The impact of processing death-related stimuli under mortality salience (MS) has been highlighted
in Terror-Management-Theory (TMT). Thus, when MS is conscious, suppressions of death
thoughts have been shown, whereas death thoughts become highly accessible when MS has
been removed from consciousness (distal defense). However, only little research has been
made taking visual stimuli processing under MS into account. Therefore, we generated a change
blindness task on a microgenetic level. Participants had to decide, whether one out of four
different pictures had been changed or not with presentation times varying from 33, 67, 134 to
534msec. Three types of action were implemented: no change, a neutral picture change, or a
change from neutral picture to a death-related picture. Before the task, participants were
randomly assigned to either a MS-treatment or a controltopic – both followed by a delay task
to investigate distal defense reactions. In accordance with TMTwe found evidence that MS-treated
participants showed higher accessibility for death-related pictures in correlation with longer
presentation times, but–most importantly–when presentation times were very short,
suppressions of perceiving death-related pictures occurred. This finding is compatible with the
idea that general perceptual processes under MS are also susceptible of a microgenetic
development.
[1P2M104] Threatening stimuli do not narrow attentional scope
Yue Yue
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The present study, using the flanker paradigm, explored whether threatening targets would
narrow attentional scope. Flanker compatibility effect was expected solely for non-threatening
targets since threat had been found to narrow attentional scope and interfere with flanker
processing (Fenske & Eastwood, 2003).Employed were photographs of felines and canines,
either threatening or not. The target images were presented as singletons or with flankers,
compatible or incompatible with the target, either in valence (threatening, non-threatening) or
the animal category. Participants performed two tasks by categorizing whether the target was (1) a
‘cat’ or a ‘dog’ and (2) threatening or non-threatening. Significant results in processing speed were
found only for the animal classification task. (i) A consistent target valence effect emerged:
threatening targets slowed down the performance. (ii) Regardless of the target valence, the
flanker facilitating (compatibility) effect was found, but only when the target and the flankers
were identical images. This latter finding implies that perceptual features of the stimuli, rather
than their emotional content, affect target processing speed (cf. Horstmann, Borgstedt, &
Heumann, 2006). Overall, the present findings do not support the hypothesis that attentional
scope is narrowed by exposure to threatening targets and indicate that task requirements
considerably influence performance.
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Distractors are devalued compared to targets and novel items in search and localization tasks
(Raymond, Fenske, & Tavassoli, 2003; Raymond, Fenske, & Westoby, 2005). This does not occur
when distractors are expected to become relevant in a subsequent task (Dittrich & Klauer, 2012),
suggesting that simply knowing the (ir)relevance of items is enough for devaluation to occur. To
test this idea, we conducted a distractor devaluation task, with added evaluations before, and also
after, target localization. Halfway through the experiment we switched the roles of targets and
distracters, in order to compare item-based evaluations in both roles. Results show that knowing
an item’s status as target or distractor suffices for distractor devaluation to arise. At the same
time, committing errors in the localization task was also associated with task performance,
indicating that task performance has effects of its own. The effects of target status and
erroneous performance both appeared to be restricted to the second run, which suggests that
the role reversal of targets and distractors was required for both types of devaluation. Results
showed that distractor devaluation persisted after the localization task ended, suggesting an
inflexibility in the termination of devaluation when an item’s irrelevance is terminated.
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Emotional information attracts attention. This claim relies on inconsistent findings from studies that
mostly use negative stimuli, tasks which target different stages of attentional selection (engagement,
disengagement) and evoke different control strategies (information relevant vs. irrelevant). Here, we
studied disruption of goal-relevant processing (i.e. capture) by negative and positive stimuli and
mechanisms used to control this distraction. In Experiment 1, irrelevant negative, positive and
neutral IAPS images, intact or scrambled, appeared peripherally on 50% of trials while
participants identified central letters. Emotional images were more distracting than neutral ones
but only when intact, supporting the role of content rather than low-level features. In Experiment 2,
we manipulated the probability of distractor presentation (25% or 75%) to determine whether
people can strategically control emotional distraction. A low distractor probability produced
substantial emotional distraction. However, a high probability almost abolished neutral and
emotional distraction, consistent with the use of a proactive control mechanism when frequent
distractors are expected. Importantly, attenuation of distraction could not be attributed to the
repetition of images. Proactive control seems equally effective at inhibiting emotional and neutral
distractors, despite the biological relevance of the former. The different control strategies triggered
by distractor probability may partly explain previous inconsistencies.
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